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Abstract: In this article, we show how the Federal Communications
Commission’s regulatory process may be used by special interests (and the
Agency) to impede the efficient functioning of a secondary market for
commercial spectrum. In particular, we show that imposing (and threatening
to impose) significant conditions when firms seek to repurpose spectrum
from a low-value to a higher-value use acts as a “tax” and thus reduces the
incentives of firms to exchange spectrum in the secondary market. As a
result, “taxation by condition” will discourage the larger scale transactions
necessary to resolve the acknowledged spectrum shortages in the
commercial mobile wireless industry, though we may still observe many
deals of a less material nature that will attract less attention and thus fewer
conditions. Our analysis also reveals that in many cases the arguments to
condition spectrum licenses based on “market power” concerns are
misguided. Market power does not over-motivate licensees to repurpose
spectrum. In fact, economic theory shows that a monopolist will repurpose
spectrum to a degree less than or equal to a benevolent “social
planner.” Accordingly, under the threat of a spectrum shortage, “taxing”
efforts to repurpose spectrum is perhaps the worst of all policies.
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I. Introduction
While offering great promise for increased innovation, efficiency, and
economic growth, the mobile revolution is threatened today by the lack of
sufficient commercial spectrum to satiate America’s ever-increasing appetite
for wireless devices. Indeed, the National Broadband Plan, released in
2010, concluded that the present inventory of commercial spectrum
represents just a fraction of the amount necessary to serve a rapidly growing
demand for mobile data. 1 While efforts are underway to hold voluntary

1. FED. TRADE COMM’N, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN 75
(2010), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-296935A1.pdf
(hereinafter the National Broadband Plan); see also Julius Genachowski, Chairman, Fed. Election
Comm’n, Prepared Remarks for 2011 International Consumer Electronics Show, Las Vegas, NV
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incentive auctions for broadcast spectrum 2 and to free up unused or
underutilized government spectrum,3 most agree that these initiatives are
years away from putting spectrum in the hands of commercial users and
will be insufficient standing alone to resolve spectrum exhaust even if fully
successful.4 As a result, the spectrum community is now exploring ways to
repurpose spectrum from lower to higher valued uses to satisfy the growing
demand. 5 For example, we have recently seen activity involving the
conversion of spectrum currently used for Mobile Satellite Service (MSS) to
terrestrial use, 6 the acquisition and conversion of WCS spectrum to

(Jan. 7, 2011), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC303984A1.pdf); Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, President Obama
Details Plan to Win the Future through Expanded Wireless Access (Feb. 10, 2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/02/10/president-obama-details-plan-win-futurethrough-expanded-wireless-access; T. Randolph Beard, et al., Wireless Competition Under
Spectrum Exhaust, 65 FED. COMM. L. J. 79 (2012); L. Strickland, AWS-3 Auction Highlights New
Approach to Spectrum Policy, Nat’l Telecomm. & Info. Admin. Blog (Jan. 29, 2015), available at
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2015/aws-3-auction-highlights-new-approach-spectrum-policy;
Jeff Kagan, Wireless Spectrum Shortage Growing, RCR WIRELESS (Jun. 15, 2015), available at
http://www.rcrwireless.com/20150615/opinion/spectrum-shortage-problem-needs-solution; Jason
Furman and Megan Smith, How to Avoid Spectrum Crunch, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 22, 2015), available
at http://www.wsj.com/articles/jason-furman-and-megan-smith-how-to-avoid-spectrum- crunch1421970841.
2. Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-96, 126 Stat 156.
3. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT — PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: REALIZING THE FULL POTENTIAL OF
GOVERNMENT-HELD SPECTRUM TO SPUR ECONOMIC GROWTH (July 2012), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/pcast_spectrum_report_final_july_
20_2012.pdf.
4. See, e.g., Id.; NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., PLAN AND TIMETABLE TO MAKE
AVAILABLE 500 MEGAHERTZ OF SPECTRUM FOR WIRELESS BROADBAND (Oct. 2010), available
at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/tenyearplan_11152010.pdf.
5. In fact, some argue that spectrum exhaust is not so much about a shortage of spectrum as
it is about a profoundly inefficient allocation of spectrum resources. See, e.g., J. Bazinet and M.
Rollins, Wireless Supply and Demand, CITI EQUITIES (Sept. 22, 2011).
6. In the Matter of Service Rules for Advanced Wireless Services in the 2000-2020 MHz and
2180-2200 MHz Bands Fixed and Mobile Services in the Mobile Satellite Service Bands at 15251559 MHz and 1626.5-1660.5 MHz, 1610-1626.5 MHz and 2483.5-2500 MHz, and 2000-2020
MHz and 2180-2200 MHz Service Rules for Advanced Wireless Services in the 1915-1920 MHz,
1995-2000 MHz, 2020-2025 MHz and 2175-2180 MHz Bands, FCC 12-151, REPORT AND ORDER
AND ORDER OF PROPOSED MODIFICATION, 27 FCC Rcd. 16102 (rel. Dec. 17, 2012) (hereinafter
“MSS Order”).
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commercial use, 7 and the transfer of idle spectrum licensed to the cable
industry to a mobile broadband provider.8
Unfortunately, repurposing spectrum (either using intra- or inter-firm
transfers) is easier said than done. While the private sector is attempting to
identify and repurpose spectrum to high–value commercial uses, all such
repurposing requires government approval. As history bears out, this
regulatory approval process is far from streamlined; instead, both the
government and the applicants’ competitors often use the regulatory process
to garner concessions that they would not otherwise be able to obtain in the
normal course of business. 9 As we show in this article, the regulatory
process essentially acts as a “tax” on private transactions in the form of
value-extracting mandatory and voluntary conditions, which in turn, affect
the evolution of and efficient functioning of a secondary market for
commercial spectrum. In so doing, “taxation by condition” will discourage
the larger scale transactions necessary to resolve spectrum exhaust from
arising, though we may still observe many deals of a less material nature that
attract less attention and thus fewer conditions.
To explore this important issue in more detail, in this article we evaluate
the effect of this “tax” on the incentives for private entities to transfer
spectrum resources from lower to higher-valued uses. Our analysis is
somewhat abstract, but our basic conclusions are both simple and of great
practical significance.

7. In the matter of Applications of AT&T Mobility Spectrum LLC, New Cingular Wireless
PCS, LLC, Comcast Corporation, Horizon Wi-Com, LLC, Nextwave Wireless, Inc., and San Diego
Gas & Electric Company for Consent to Assign and Transfer Licenses, FCC 12-156
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER, 27 FCC Rcd. 16459 (rel. Dec. 18, 2012); see also J. Crook,
AT&T Acquires NextWave (And Its WCS Spectrum) For Up to $50M To Build Out 4G
LTE Network, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 2, 2012), available at http://techcrunch.com/2012/08/02/attacquires-nextwave-and-its-wcs-spectrum-for-25m-to-build-out-4g-lte-network.
8. In the Matter of Applications of Cellco Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless and
SpectrumCo LLC and Cox TMI, LLC For Consent To Assign AWS-1 Licenses Applications of
Verizon Wireless and Leap for Consent To Exchange Lower 700 MHz, AWS-1, and PCS Licenses
Applications of T-Mobile License LLC and Cellco Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless for Consent
to Assign Licenses, FCC 12-95, MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER AND DECLARATORY
RULING, 27 FCC Rcd. 12154 (rel. Aug. 23, 2012).
9. See Thomas M. Koutsky & Lawrence J. Spiwak, Separating Politics from Policy in FCC
Merger Reviews: A Basic Legal Primer of The “Public Interest” Standard, 18 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 329 (2010); T. Randolph Beard, George S. Ford, Lawrence J. Spiwak and Michael
Stern, Eroding the Rule of Law: Regulation as Cooperative Bargaining at the FCC, PHOENIX
CENTER POL’Y PAPER NO. 49 (2015), available at http://www.phoenix-center.org/pcpp/
PCPP49Final.pdf.
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For example, we show that the practice of conditioning (and threatening
to condition) spectrum repurposing impedes such activity and interferes with
the development of a vibrant secondary market. Conditions are a form of a
tax, and basic economic logic tells us that taxes reduce the incentive to make
transactions. Likewise, prolonged delays on requests to repurpose spectrum
also operate as a tax on transactions. Equally as important, we show that
when spectrum has a higher value in some different use, both the private firm
and the social planner want to reallocate spectrum to the higher value use.
Economic theory also shows that a monopolist will seek to reallocate an
amount of spectrum less than or equal to that of a benevolent regulator (i.e.,
a welfare-maximizing social planner). The difference is attributable to the
fact that the social planner’s decisions are based on total surplus, while the
monopolist is motivated only by profits. Nevertheless, under some
conditions, the monopolist and the social planner make the same decisions.
Accordingly, our analysis suggests that arguments to “tax” (or outright
prohibit) such efforts to acquire and repurpose spectrum based on simplistic
“market power” concerns are misguided. Our model suggests that market
power does not provide an incentive to repurpose “too much” spectrum from
a social perspective.
The policy implications of our work are clear: If the FCC wants to
alleviate spectrum shortages and to encourage the facilitation of a secondary
market for spectrum licenses, then “taxing” efforts to repurpose spectrum to
higher valued uses like mobile data in the form of license conditions is
perhaps the worst of all policies. Instead, barring legitimate competitive or
interference concerns, efforts to repurpose spectrum from low- to high-value
uses should be expeditiously approved without extraneous conditions.
Moreover, regardless of the Commission’s (or other’s) social goals (e.g.,
universal broadband), the costly and often implicit restrictions on trading
spectrum rights are an enormously bad way to achieve those objectives. This
strong conclusion is a direct consequence of the economic implications of
the agency’s conditioning approach, which amounts to a form of taxation
that applies only to repurposing of spectrum that increase the market value
of the spectrum resource. That is, the agency is taxing only those
transactions that create enough value to manifest as a transaction.
Our article is outlined as follows. In Section II, we discuss a recent
proceeding before the FCC involving a license repurposing to illustrate
efforts by private interests to “tax” secondary market transactions where a
party is seeking to move spectrum from low to higher value uses, namely
DISH’s efforts to repurpose spectrum used for Mobile Satellite Service
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(MSS) to terrestrial commercial use. 10 Although the FCC, to its credit,
ultimately rejected such proposals, this proceeding provides a useful case
study to illustrate many of the common landmines involved with efforts to
repurpose spectrum. In Section III, we provide an economic framework to
evaluate the effect of proposed “taxes” on spectrum transactions. As we
show, the types of taxes proposed by both the government and private sector
entities alike interfere with private efforts to reduce spectrum congestion and
impede the efficient functioning of a secondary market for commercial
spectrum, which in turn, harms overall welfare. Policy implications and
conclusions are contained in the final two sections of the paper.

II. “Taxing” Spectrum Repurposing Case Study: The Mobile
Satellite Service Proceeding
As noted above, our purpose in this article is to contemplate why a largescale secondary market in the U.S. has been so slow to develop despite the
obvious need to reallocate spectrum resources to higher valued uses.11 By any
measure, too much spectrum — both government and commercial —
remains unused or underutilized. Since all secondary market transactions
and adjustments to existing licenses require FCC’s review and approval, it is
sensible to look at the review process as a possible source of dysfunction.
To do so, we examine the most basic problem of allocating a finite amount
of spectrum between two economic markets, A and B. Such repurposing
requires FCC’s approval, and history shows that the approval process is rife
with rent seeking activity that sometimes results in the levying of a “tax” on
the transaction by the Commission in the form of costly conditions, if they
grant it at all. 12 As such, we study the implication of such tax on the
repurposing spectrum, and reveal how such interventions impede the
development of (and the nature of) a large-scale secondary market for
spectrum.
Prior to the theoretical analysis, we set the stage for the theory with a
case study of spectrum repurposing and reassignment. Fortunately, we are
10. MSS Order, supra note 6.
11. See, e.g., John W. Mayo & Scott Wallsten, Enabling Efficient Wireless Communications:
The Role of Secondary Spectrum Markets, 22 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 61–72 (2010); Jeffrey A. Eisenach
and Hall J. Singer, Avoiding Rent-Seeking in Secondary Market Spectrum Transactions, 65 FED.
COMM. L.J. 261–96 (2013), available at http://www.fclj.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/65-3Singer.pdf); Randall Berry, Michael L. Honig, and Rakesh Vohra, Spectrum Markets: Motivation,
Challenges, and Implications, 48 COMM. MAG., IEEE 146–155 (2010).
12. See, e.g., Mayo & Wallsten, supra note 11; Eisenach & Singer, supra note 11; Koutsky
& Spiwak, supra note 9; Beard, et al., Eroding the Rule of Law, supra note 9.
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presented with an excellent case study in the current debate — i.e., the FCC’s
recent experience with repurposing spectrum formally assigned for Mobile
Satellite Service in the 2000-2020 MHz band and 2180-2200 MHz bands
(hereinafter “S-Band”) to terrestrial commercial use.13 Making a very long
and complicated story short, as the name implies, MSS spectrum was
originally intended for a mobile communications service provided by
satellites.
Despite significant early interest, the service was not
economically viable and eventually all MSS providers went bankrupt and
out of business. 14 In 2011, DISH Network Corporation (DISH) received
approval from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District
of New York to acquire 40 MHz of MSS spectrum in the 2 GHz band
(hereinafter, the “AWS-4” spectrum) for approximately $3 billion15 with the
stated goal of repurposing this spectrum to try to build a new nationwide
LTE network.16 Recognizing the important potential for this MSS spectrum
to be converted for terrestrial commercial use, 17 in March 2012 the FCC
issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to do just that. 18 Despite the

13. MSS Order, supra note 6.
14. See In the Matter of Serv. Rules for Advanced Wireless Servs. in the 2000-2020 Mhz &
2180-2200 Mhz Bands, 27 FCC Rcd. 3561 (2012) (hereinafter MSS NPRM) at ¶¶ 3-9 (Significantly,
the agency’s own Bureau Chiefs recognized in the Harbinger Order that the primary reason why
no “next generation” MSS services exist yet is because MSS companies have had to change
constantly “their plans over the past years, both in response to changing economic times and to
changes in Commission rules”); In the Matter of Skyterra Commc’ns, Inc., 25 FCC Rcd. 3059, 3085
at ¶ 54 (2010) (hereinafter Harbinger Order).
15. See Greg Avery, Dish’s Plan for TerreStar Nework gets Judge’s Approval, DENVER BUS.
J. (Feb. 16, 2012, 10:56 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/denver/blog/boosters_bits/2012/
02/dishs-plan-for-terrestar-network-gets.html; In the Matter of Dbsd N. Am., Inc., Debtor-inPossession; New Dbsd Satellite Servs. G.P., Debtor-in-Possession; Pendrell Corp., Transferor; &
Terrestar License Inc., Debtor-in-Possession; Assignor, & Dish Network Corp., Transferee; &
Gamma Acquisition L.L.C.; Assignee in the Matters of New Dbsd Satellite Servs. G.P., Debtor-inPossession Terrestar Licensee Inc., Debtor-in-Possession, 27 FCC Rcd. 2250, 2250 (2012) (On
Mar. 2, 2012, the Int’l Bureau granted the applications for transfer of control of the DBSD and
TerreStar licenses to DISH) (hereinafter DISH Transfer Order); Id. at ¶ 29 (In doing so, the Bureau
denied DISH’s request for waivers to allow terrestrial use of the AWS-4 spectrum, preferring the
“rulemaking approach.”).
16. Greg Avery, Dish’s Plan for TerreStar Network gets Judge’s Approval, DENVER BUS. J.
(Feb. 16, 2012, 10:56 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/denver/blog/boosters_bits/2012/02/dishsplan-for-terrestar-network-gets.html (quoting DISH’s press release “Dish would immediately begin
the design and construction planning for the nation’s first 100 percent LTE network”).
17. See Fed. Commc’s Comm’n, National Broadband Plan, supra note 1, at 87 (“The FCC
should build on past efforts to enable terrestrial deployment in MSS bands. The MSS allocation
consists of a significant amount of bandwidth with propagation characteristics suitable for mobile
broadband.”)
18. MSS NPRM, supra note 14.
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Commission’s own repeated calls for prompt action to transition the AWS4 spectrum to terrestrial use, it took the Commission seven months after
DISH sought the license transfers (in 2011) to initiate the rulemaking.19 The
Agency’s final decision would come nine months later in December 2012.20
While sixteen months is hardly expeditious, the unconditioned grant of the
transfer is a model of future actions on spectrum transfers.
A review of the record in this proceeding reveals that both the
Commission and various special interests had proposed a number of costly
conditions and spectrum encumbrances on the transaction. These proposed
conditions were, in many cases, quite harsh and would be expected to reduce
substantially the value of the transaction to DISH, in the same way a tax on
the transaction would reduce value.21 In the MSS NPRM, for example, these
proposed conditions included, but were not limited to, the following:22
A. Build-out Requirements and Forfeiture Penalties

Even though DISH has proposed to transfer spectrum to the capacityconstrained mobile broadband market, where spectrum is highly sought after
by regulators and policymakers generally, the Commission had proposed to
impose the following stringent build-out requirements on DISH as a
precondition of repurposing the spectrum:

19. See DISH Network Corporation Files to Acquire Control of Licenses and Authorizations
Held By New DBSD Satellite Services G.P, Debtor-in-Possession and TerreStar License Inc.,
Debtor-in-Possession, IB Docket No. 11150, Public Notice, 26 FCC Rcd. 13018, 13020-1 (2011)
(DBSD and TerreStar Transfer of Control Public Notice). National Broadband Plan, supra note
1, Recommendation 5.8.4, Exhibit 5E.
20. MSS Order, supra note 6.
21. To see the “tax” analogy more clearly, assume that in an unregulated state the value of
the deal to DISH is V. Conditions on the deal are costly (the cost of which are labeled C), so if the
FCC imposes some or all of the proposed conditions on the transfer, then the value of the transfer
is V - C, where C is positive. Likewise, if the FCC imposed a “deal tax” of T, the value of the
transaction would be V – T. Or, say that the conditions extract proportion t of the total value V, so
that C = tV. If so, DISH receives only V(1 - t) of the total value. Plainly, the conditions placed on
spectrum reallocations may be viewed as a tax (with tax rate T or t).
22. Indeed, while we use the MSS proceeding as a case study, we have seen many of these
exact types of “taxes” raised in other secondary market transactions. See, e.g., Public Knowledge,
AT&T Spectrum Deals Demonstrate Broken Spectrum Policy (Aug. 2, 2012) (“. . . the FCC needs
to adopt build-out policies that discourage speculation, and ‘use it or share it’ policies that allow
for unlicensed use of fallow spectrum. Finally, the FCC needs to update its spectrum screen to
discourage the same few companies from acquiring more and more of this vital resource”),
available at http://www.publicknowledge.org/broken-spectrum-policy; see also T. R. Beard, G. S.
Ford, L. J. Spiwak and M. Stern, A Policy Framework for Spectrum Allocation in Mobile
Communications, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 693 (2011).
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 Within three years, DISH shall provide signal coverage and offer
service to at least thirty percent of their total AWS-4 population.
DISH’s total AWS-4 population shall be calculated by summing the
population of each of its license authorizations in the AWS-4 band (the
“Interim Build-Out Requirement”); and
 Within seven years, DISH shall provide signal coverage and offer
service to at least seventy percent of the population in each of its license
authorization areas (the “Final Build-Out Requirement”).23
In addition to these stringent build-out requirements, the Commission
proposed aggressive penalties should DISH fail to meet these requirements.
Specifically:
 In the event DISH fails to meet the AWS-4 Interim Build-Out
Requirement, “all of the licensee’s AWS-4 license authorizations shall
terminate automatically without Commission action” (emphasis in
original); and
 In the event DISH fails to meet the AWS-4 Final Build-Out
Requirement in any of its license authorizations, its AWS-4 license for
each license authorization areas in which it fails to meet the build-out
requirement shall terminate automatically without Commission
action.24
These penalties were quite severe. As explained by the Commission, DISH’s
“failure to meet the AWS-4 Interim Build-out Requirement would result in
the AWS-4 and 2 GHz MSS licenses automatically terminating in all license
areas (i.e., nationwide).” 25 In other words, if DISH failed to meet the
requirements, it would lose its licenses in an automatic termination. And as
if this was not enough, not only would its “terrestrial spectrum rights would
become available for reassignment pursuant to the competitive bidding,” but
DISH “would be precluded from regaining” these rights in the future. 26
Plainly, by accelerating the cost of entry in an already competitive market,
build-out conditions can be expected to discourage spectrum holders to enter
the secondary market. 27 While there may be legitimate reasons for

23. MSS NPRM, supra note 14, at ¶¶ 92-93.
24. Id. at ¶ 94.
25. Id. at ¶ 95 (emphasis added).
26. Id. at ¶ 96.
27. See, e.g., George S. Ford, et al., The Economics of Build-Out Rules in Cable Television,
28 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 207 (2006); Thomas W. Hazlett & George S. Ford, The Fallacy
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encouraging the use of spectrum resources sooner rather than later, a buildout requirement that is overly aggressive will discourage the transfer of
spectrum to higher valued uses, especially if the lower valued use has a more
lax build-out rule.
B. Mandatory Wholesale Requirements

Several commenters argued that the Commission should force DISH to
“make available a minimum portion of their spectrum capacity at wholesale
rates.” Some commenters left the determination of “minimum portion” up
to the Commission. 28 Others argued that DISH should make up to fifty
percent of capacity in each economic area available for wholesale leasing.29
Regardless of the size of the potential set-aside, however, such mandatory
wholesale requirements would reduce the value of the spectrum.
C. Restrictions on Wholesale Capacity

Not content with having the Commission force DISH to carve out a
portion of its spectrum for wholesale use, some commenters wanted the
Commission to impose conditions on how DISH could resell this wholesale
capacity. For example, several commenters argued that DISH must obtain
prior FCC approval before entering into any wholesale agreement for more
than a “substantial percentage” (i.e., twenty-five percent) of the total traffic
carried over DISH’s terrestrial network. Some commenters would limit this
preapproval requirement only to cases involving the two largest CMRS
providers (i.e., AT&T and Verizon)30; others would apply this provision to
any CMRS carrier.31 However, one commenter (RCA) asked that DISH not
be allowed to enter into any agreement — no matter how large or small —
with AT&T or Verizon without prior FCC approval.32 Such constraints on
the post-transfer business plan obviously reduce the value of the spectrum
repurposing.
of Regulatory Symmetry: An Economic Analysis of the Level Playing Field in Cable TV Franchising
Statutes, 3 BUS. & POL. 21 (2001).
28. RCA Comments to the MSS NPRM at ¶ 4.
29. New America, et al., Comments to the MSS NPRM at 8–9.
30. New America, et al., Comments to the MSS NPRM at 11–13.
31. T-Mobile Comments to the MSS NPRM at 16–17.
32. RCA Comments in the MSS NPRM at 7. We note that this type of “voluntary
commitment” was also imposed in the Harbinger Order, supra note 14, albeit with both
questionable societal benefits, T. R. Beard et al., A Policy Framework for Spectrum Allocation in
Mobile Communications, supra note 22, as well as significant due process questions. G.S. Ford,
L. J. Spiwak & M. Stern, The Broadband Credibility Gap, 19 COMM. L. CONSPECTUS 75 (2010).
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D. Resale “Flipping” Restrictions

Because DISH did not purchase the MSS spectrum at auction but rather
out of bankruptcy from the original licensees, several parties argued that
repurposing the MSS for terrestrial commercial use will somehow result in
a “windfall” and “unjustly enrich” DISH. (As noted above, DISH paid $3
billion for the licenses.) Accordingly, several commenters argued that if
DISH “flips” the spectrum within a five year period to an incumbent CMRS
provider, then the FCC should impose an “unjust enrichment penalty”
similar to the penalties imposed for designated entity bidding.33
E. “Spectrum Squatting”

One of the more interesting proposed conditions was what we can best
describe as “spectrum squatting” — that is, the FCC should only grant the
AWS-4 license on the condition that DISH make any fallow spectrum
available for “temporary shared access” through the TV bands data base until
such time as DISH commences actual service in a geographic area.34
F. Reauction of Spectrum Already Paid for in the Commercial Secondary
Market

Not to be outdone, several commenters argued that DISH should not be
entitled to use all of the spectrum it bought out of bankruptcy. For example,
several commenters argued that Commission should simply take back 20
MHz of the 40 MHZ of MSS spectrum purchased for reauction via
competitive bidding.35 In fact, one commenter even went so far as to argue
that the Commission should seize 30 MHz (a whopping three quarters of the
total capacity at issue in the MSS NPRM) in the top one hundred
Metropolitan Statistical Areas for competitive bidding.36
G. Changes in Band Plan for Already Acquired Spectrum

Finally, there were proposals to alter the 2 GHz band plan altogether and
shift DISH’s spectrum up 5 MHz, as well as other proposals to modify the 2

33. New America, et al., Comments to the MSS NPRM at 18; RCA Comments in the MSS
NPRM at 11.
34. New America, et al., Comments to the MSS NPRM at 13.
35. T-Mobile Comments to the MSS NPRM at 17; Metro PCS Comments in the MSS NPRM
at 30.
36. Metro PCS Comments to the MSS NPRM at 32–33.
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GHz band.37 In particular, although DISH acquired a specific 40 MHz of
spectrum in the secondary market, some parties nonetheless wanted the
Commission unilaterally change DISH’s spectrum holdings in the MSS
proceeding. There was some debate in the proceeding as to whether or not
interference or other considerations warrant the modification, 38 but the
relevant issue (as we see it) was the settled expectations of a buyer of spectrum
in the secondary market. DISH had invested billions of dollars to acquire
AWS-4 spectrum and satellites that DISH asserts will only operate on the
specific 40 MHz of AWS-4 spectrum.39 According to DISH, this investment
was based, in part, on the attractiveness of this spectrum for global
harmonization and the significant development work already completed to
transition this spectrum for mobile broadband use.40 Specifically, standard
setting groups had been working since 2009 on the standards necessary to
provide for handset standards, filter design, and other technology
advancements necessary to rollout services for the AWS-4 spectrum.41 A
change in the band plan at this late date might have required an entirely new
standard setting process and delay service to consumers for years with
obvious potential impact on the value of this spectrum.
H. Summary: Paying the “Vig”42

Plainly, in the case study outlined above, all of these proposed
conditions would have reduced the value of the MSS spectrum.43 For this

37. Sprint Nextel Comments to the MSS NPRM at 11; U.S. Cellular Comments to the MSS
NPRM at 5–6; MSS NPRM, supra note 14, at ¶¶ 42-43, 137–147.
38. See e.g., Letter from DISH to FCC, WT Docket No. 12-70 (Aug. 21, 2012).
39. DISH Reply Comments to the MSS NPRM at 28–29.
40. See e.g., In the Matter of Service Rules for Advanced Wireless Services in the 2000-2020
MHz and 2180-2200 MHz Bands Fixed and Mobile Services in the Mobile Satellite Service Bands at
1525-1559 MHz and 1626.5- 1660.5 MHz, 1610-1626.5 MHz and 2483.5-2500 MHz, and 2000-2020
MHz and 2180-2200 MHz Service Rules for Advanced Wireless Services in the 1915-1920 MHz, 19952000 MHz, 2020-2025 MHz and 2175-2180 MHz Bands (Letter from DISH to FCC), WT Docket No.
12-70 (August 21, 2012); DISH Reply Comments supra note 14, at 24–29.
41. Id.
42. Vigorish, or the “vig,” is the amount charged by a bookmaker for its services.
43. However, we emphasize again that this pattern of value extraction is not unique to the
DISH transaction. In nearly every license transfer of significance, the FCC imposes conditions on
the transaction. See Koutsky and Spiwak, supra note 9; Beard et al., Eroding the Rule of Law,
supra note 9. Indeed, it is important to recognize that our critiques do not go to whether the FCC’s
should play a role in reviewing communications industry “mergers” broadly, but rather to the way
the agency conducts one of its core missions as the so-called “expert agency”: spectrum
repurposing and relicensing.
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reason, it is not difficult to see why firms with spectrum holdings are
reluctant to bring its spectrum to the secondary market, even if the next best
option is to let the spectrum lay fallow or be grossly underutilized. Indeed,
some of the proposals outlined above nakedly sought to have the government
use its coercive power to confiscate large portions of the spectrum resources
involved in the deal. By its actions — whether proposing, implementing, or
even entertaining such conditions — the FCC sends a signal to those wanting
to trade or alter licenses: when you bring your spectrum to the agency, be
prepared to “pay the vig.” As is standard, taxing an activity leads to less of
it, and we conclude that the lack of a robust secondary market for spectrum
in the U.S. is related, in part if not mostly, to the potential for taxing (i.e.,
conditioning) valuable transactions when reviewing and approving license
transfers. The considerable delay and uncertainty resulting from prolonged
FCC proceedings only act as an additional “tax.” The theoretical
implications are demonstrated below.

III. An Economic Framework for Secondary Market
Transactions
Our economic analysis springs from a basic observation that motivates
most discussions of broadband policy in the United States today: the amount
of spectrum available for commercial applications in fast growing, high
value applications such as mobile broadband services is increasingly
inadequate to meet the demands for these services. This situation can only
be expected to get worse, barring a significant addition to spectrum
availability through reassignment of public spectrum, or else some important
technical improvement. Thus, spectrum forms a limitational input in the
production of mobile data services. The amount of services that may be
provided can be limited by the available amount of spectrum, in the same
way as the diameter of a pipeline can practically limit the amount of water
that can be pumped from one location to another. Although one can imagine
technical upgrades that may substitute for spectrum over some limited range,
the existence of such means will not change our basic story, although such
extensions greatly complicate the model.44 Thus, we restrict our attention
here to the extreme case of spectrum availability as an absolute capacity limit
for the production of the relevant services.

44. See, e.g., Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Mobile Broadband: The Benefits of Additional
Spectrum, OBI Tech. Paper No. 6, 6–10 (Oct. 2010), http://download.broadband.gov/plan/fcc
-staff-technical-paper-mobile-broadband-benefits-ofadditional-spectrum.pdf.
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In order to make the point as simple as possible, we will examine the
basic problem of allocating a finite amount of spectrum between two
economic markets, A and B.45 While products A and B both require spectrum
to “produce,” the two products are not substitutes or complements to one
another, so that their demands can be taken to be independent. This
assumption is also not critical, and serves to simplify what follows. The
production of services A and B is assumed to require precisely one unit of
capacity per unit produced. We ignore other inputs and assume, again for
simplicity, that the marginal costs are zero, since the inclusion of positive,
constant marginal costs and alternative fixed input requirement ratios is an
unimportant complication.
Our goals in what follows are to illustrate the consequences of the
spectrum constraint on the welfare properties of the private allocation of
spectrum (i.e., that which occurs sans regulatory intervention), and to show
how the presence of a spectrum constraint makes the general policy of
pursuing social or other goals via restrictions on the transfer of necessary
inputs an inefficient approach in general. As discussed above, to achieve
this we will interpret the potential regulatory intervention into the
reassignment of spectrum as an implicit tax on the transaction, since costly
requirements imposed on transfers have the effect of raising the costs of the
spectrum transfer to the participants. Thus, the notion of a tax on input
transfers will provide us with a simple and general means for evaluating
spectrum regulation, which avoids the necessity of considering the specific
form the regulatory requirements might take. For example, if regulators
required firms wishing to trade spectrum to build out their networks to serve
areas that are uneconomic from the firms’ points of view, then the
requirement — which might have other, noneconomic benefits in the
regulators’ calculus — affects the firm as would a tax on the transaction.
Using this generalization, we can obtain results relevant to virtually any
costly requirement.
Although all economic resources are, by definition, “scarce,” radio
spectrum is scarce in a somewhat more profound sense in the information
technology markets than is, say, labor or equipment. By giving up something
else, society can provide more workers or capital for the production of
mobile Internet service. In contrast, spectrum used in this process is assigned
by law and the availability of technically useful frequencies is seriously
constrained by the laws of physics. Many markets in the United States are
45. The transfer may be either intra- or inter-firm, though we contemplate in our model an intrafirm transfer by a monopolist in an effort to assess the effect of market power on incentives.
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confronting “spectrum exhaust,” and network performance degradation is
already observed in some areas.46 While technical means for using existing
licensed spectrum more efficiently are under active investigation, few
observers suggest this effort will solve the problem of the crowded airwaves
in the near or intermediate terms.47 Moreover, the strong interest of many
firms in acquiring additional spectrum is evidence of the spectrum
shortage.48 Our analysis takes this circumstance as a primary assumption,
and our model is applicable only to circumstances in which output is
constrained in some relevant sense.
A. The Formal Model

To begin, suppose that a fixed resource (“spectrum”) can be allocated
to serve two markets: A and B. Let QA and QB denote the quantity of
spectrum allocated to each market, and let the total amount of spectrum be
denoted by S, so that QA + QB = S. As mentioned above, we will assume that
a unit of spectrum will be transformed into a standard unit of output in both
markets, so that the outputs produced, also denoted QA and QB, must satisfy
QA + QB ≤ S. Because our interest is in those situations in which output is
constrained by available spectrum, we will ignore (for now) the case in
which spectrum allocated to either market is allowed to lay fallow. We will,

46. Indeed, there is already mounting anecdotal evidence that firms are responding to
spectrum constraints with price to ration available capacity. See, e.g., AT&T, Rate Increase for
Legacy Unlimited Smartphone Data Plans, AT&T SUPPORT (last visited Feb. 8, 2016),
https://www.att.com/esupport/article.html?source=EC1N0000000wvc00D&wtExtndSource=un
ltdata#!/wireless/KM1064176; Mike Dano, Sprint to Raise Price of Unlimited Data Plan From
$60/Month to $70/Month Starting Oct. 16, FIERCEWIRELESS (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.fierce
wireless.com/story/sprint-raise-price-unlimited-data-plan-60month-70month-starting-oct16/201509-30; David Goldman, T-Mobile Hikes Price of Unlimited Plans by $15, CNN (Nov. 11, 2015),
http://money.cnn.com/2015/11/11/technology/tmobile-unlimited-plans; Jose Pagliery, Verizon to
Add $20 to Grandfathered Unlimited Data Plans, CNN (Oct. 8, 2015, 5:26 PM), http://money.
cnn.com/2015/10/08/technology/verizon-unlimited-plan-increase.
47. Locke, supra note 4; see also Liz Klimas, Running Out of Radio Waves? Mobile Carriers
Think So But Others Say Just Improve Technology, THE BLAZE (Apr. 18, 2012, 1:30 AM),
http://www.theblaze.com/stories/running-out-of-radio-waves-mobile-carriers-think-so-but-otherssay-just-improve-technology; 10 Ways to Deal with Mobile Data Capacity Crunch, AMDOCS
(2012), http://www.amdocs.com/Whitepapers/OSS/WhitePaper-MobileDataCapacity
Crunch.pdf; Richard Bennett, Powering the Mobile Revolution: Principles of Spectrum Allocation,
INFO. AND TECH. FOUND. (Jul. 31, 2012), http://www.itif.org/publications/powering-mobilerevolution-principles-spectrum-allocation.
48. See, e.g., In re AT&T Inc. and Qualcomm Inc. For Consent To Assign Licenses and
Authorizations, WT Docket No. 11-18, Order, 26 FCC Rcd. 17589 (released Dec. 22, 2011);
Cellco, supra note 8.
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however, have a bit more to say about this assumption below. We also
normalize the marginal production costs to zero for both goods.
We will examine, in turn, the spectrum allocation problems of the
socially conscious regulator and a monopoly, for-profit firm (which exposes
the consequences of market power most clearly). For simplicity, we assume
the monopolist is repurposing its own spectrum rather than buying or selling
spectrum to an unrelated party. We will characterize the socially optimal
allocation of spectrum between the two markets, and compare this allocation
with that which would arise under a monopoly or cartel provider
environment. Our interest focuses on when and how these allocations might
differ, and the source of those differences. As will be seen, asymmetries
between the two markets create incentives for both the regulator and the firm
to adjust their spectrum allocations. However, the natures of those
asymmetries are relevant for the solutions of these problems, and we
consider two cases of demand asymmetry as a result. These two cases are,
in turn, motivated by two primary ways in which one market could differ
from the other. First, one market might contain customers highly similar to
those in another market, but more of them. In this case, the market demands
will differ by their slopes (a rotation of demand on its axis), but not their
price intercepts, a consequence of aggregating the demands of similar agents.
In contrast, one market could offer a product of higher marginal value than
another, so that the willingness to pay of consumers for units of spectrumderived service differs by some positive amount. In this case, the demands
might have the same slopes, but one would be above the other, having a
higher price intercept (a parallel shift in demand).49 For those that do not
wish to carefully study the derivation of the model, a numerical example
based on the theory is provided in Subsection F below.
B. Allocating Spectrum Across Markets

Let the market demands for A and B be given by:
PA  M  aQ A

(1)

PB  M  bQ B

(2)

where M is the common willingness-to-pay intercept and a, b are the slope
parameters. The social planner who sought to maximize welfare would

49. In reality the relationships between the demands will be more complex than this, but we
are only looking to establish the point at issue.
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allocate the scarce spectrum across the two markets in order to maximize
consumer surplus alone, since production is costless by assumption. (The
social planner maximizes consumer and producer surplus, but we have
assumed zero producer surplus in this case. The monopolist maximizes
profits, thus leading to a different objective function relative to the social
planner.) Formally, the social planner solves:


max   PA (Q )dQ 
Q A ,Q B 
0
QA

QB



 PB (Q)dQ
0



(3)

such that QA + QB = S. The first-order condition for this constrained
maximization problem yields the basic characterization that the social
planner would attempt to equate prices in the two markets:
PA (Q Ae )  PB (Q Be ) .

(4)

The price-equality result is intuitive and quite standard, although it appears
novel because of the nature of the constraint. This condition implies that the
regulators should allocate scarce spectrum to make the marginal rate of
substitution (“MRS”) equal for consumers across both markets. If the MRS
(between the goods produced by spectrum and a numéraire good) were not
equal, further repurposing would improve aggregate surplus. Thus, if one
market is different than the other, the regulator would allocate spectrum to
produce price equality between them.
Combined with the spectrum constraint, this result yields the socially
efficient allocation of spectrum for market B:
QBe 

aS
.
ab

(5)

Suppose, however, that the allocation of spectrum was left in the hands of a
for profit-maximizing monopoly firm? Would the allocation of spectrum by
the monopoly differ from that of the social planner? To answer this question,
we consider the monopoly problem associated with the demand system and
the resource constraint above:
max PAQ A  PBQ B  such that Q A  Q B  S .

Q A ,Q B

The first-order condition implies:

(6)
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2 aQ A*  2 bQ B* .

(7)

Hence, the monopoly firm would allocate the scarce spectrum in the same
manner as the social planner:
Q B* 

aS
,
ab

(8)

which can be seen by comparing Expression (8) and (5). This result
illustrates an important point, although it is derived in a special setting. In
the presence of a binding spectrum constraint, the ordinary differences
between profit-maximizing and welfare-maximizing behavior are
attenuated. This occurs precisely because of the constraint. 50 We will
examine this tendency further below.
C. Reallocating Spectrum after Changes in Market Conditions: Rotating
Demand Curves

In the practical world, supply and demand conditions are always
changing. Thus, allocating spectrum is not a “once and for all” problem, and
the challenge confronting the industry and its regulators is to make
adjustments in their business plans and rules as markets and technology
evolves. This is obviously a difficult problem. Consider, for example, the
response of the regulator and the monopoly to a change in the size (number
of customers) in market B, say. In this case, a simple representation of
demands is given by demand curves with differing slopes, but the same
intercept. Graphically, the demand curve rotates on its price axis. How
would the social planner and the monopoly firm respond?
Let us suppose that there is an increase in the size (the number of
~
consumers) in market B, so that b  b :

~
~
PB  M  b QB .

(9)

The social planner would increase the spectrum allocation to the growing
market as follows:
aS
~
e
QBe 
~  QB .
ab

50.

(10)

See also Beard, et al., Wireless Competition Under Spectrum Exhaust, supra note 1.
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Thus, the socially conscious regulator responds to market growth by
allocating more spectrum to the larger market, at the expense of the relatively
smaller market.
Unsurprisingly, the monopoly would follow suit, reallocating spectrum
to the larger market from the smaller market. The resulting allocation is:

~ ~
QBe  QB* ,

(11)

so the monopolist acts in precisely the same way as the social planner. So,
while FCC intervention and conditioning of spectrum license transfers is
sometimes defended on the grounds that it is a response to market power in
some wireless markets, at least in the circumstances assumed here economic
theory does not provide justification for regulation of this sort. Under
spectrum exhaust, the benevolent regulator and the monopoly (or cartel)
allocate spectrum in the same way. As such, market power (even in the
extreme case assumed here) is not a basis for interfering with efforts to
attenuate spectrum exhaust through private-sector efforts at spectrum
repurposing.
D. FCC Review and the Taxation of Secondary Market Transactions

FCC restrictions and conditions on spectrum repurposing take many
forms, as discussed above. For our purposes, such policies can be abstractly
represented as taxes on the transfers of spectrum assets. We wish to examine
the consequences of taxes of this sort on the welfare properties of the
allocation of spectrum when there is market power, i.e., monopoly.
Suppose market A is stagnating, but market B is growing (a change
captured as shown in Expression 9). As we just demonstrated, the monopoly
wishes to transfer spectrum from A to B in order to capitalize on the higher
returns available in B. The regulator, however, imposes restrictions on this
activity which we represent as a tax t imposed on the quantity of spectrum
transferred (i.e., a per megahertz fee). In other words, the firm faces a higher
tax bill as it tries to repurpose more spectrum. The monotonic relationship
between the firm’s tax liability and the size of the spectrum transferred
appears to us to be quite realistic in the context of the history of such disputes
at the Commission.51
With a linear tax, the firm’s problem would be:

51. Nearly any form of taxation on the deal will create a disincentive to the transaction. That
said, one particular form of “taxation” may have a more or less pernicious effect than others.
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(12)

R denotes the total revenue function (price times quantity) and Δ is the
amount of spectrum moved from A to B. The first-order condition for the
firm’s maximization problem is given by:

~
2a(QA*  )  2b (QB*  )  t  0 .

(13)

Solving for the optimal amount of spectrum to shift from market A to the
growing market B:
~ *
*
~ aQ A  b Q B  t / 2 .

~
ab

(14)

Thus, we can see that the tax imposed on the repurposing of spectrum
reduces the amount of spectrum that the firm will shift to the growing market.
When t > 0,

~
~ ~
QB* (t)  QB*    QBe .

(15)

A positive tax rate will therefore make the amount of spectrum shifted
towards market B less than it is socially optimal. Plainly, if the Commission
wants to increase the amount of spectrum allocated to mobile data use, then
levying taxes on transactions that make such transfers is precisely the wrong
policy.
E. An Alternative Demand Specification

The analysis given above uses a particular sort of demand asymmetry
— that of similar markets of different sizes — and it is important to
determine the extent to which the findings are dependent on that
specification. To that end, we now turn briefly to a parallel analysis using
our alternative description of the demand differences between A and B. For
brevity, we skip the intermediate steps and proceed immediately to the
analysis of how the monopoly owner and the social planner would reallocate
spectrum as market B expands.
Consider a case in which the growth in market B is due to an increase
in consumer valuations of the product in question, rather than to an increase
in the number of consumers. Graphically, this is represented by a parallel
shift in the demand curve. We can model this alternate situation by
~
increasing the intercept of the demand curve, so that M  M :
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(16)

The social planner would increase the spectrum allocation to the growing
market as follows:
~
aS  ( M  M )
~
Q Be 
 Q Be .
ab

(17)

This condition once again can be interpreted as assuring equal marginal rates
of substitution across markets A and B.
What, though, of the monopoly or cartelized industry? Left to its own
devices and profit motives, a monopoly would also increase the spectrum
allocated to the growing market, but in this case, would not go as far as the
social planner.
~
aS  0.5( M  M ) ~ e
~
Q B* 
 QB .
ab

(18)

Here we observe a difference between the social planner and the for-profit
firm in the allocation decision. In this case, the difference arises because of
the nature of the differences between market demands under this
specification. In particular, unlike the “scaling” case considered before, here
the monopoly reallocates too little spectrum to the growing market. This is
a consequence of double marginalization. Under uniform prices, the
monopoly is unable to capture all of the additional value available in market
B. Thus, it is “under-motivated” to reallocate spectrum in this case.
In this case, the monopoly under-allocates spectrum (from a social
welfare perspective) to the growing market (even in the absence of a tax). If
the FCC imposed a tax on the firm for repurposing spectrum, then the firm
would be pushed even further away from the social optimum:
~
~ 0 .5( M  M )  t / 2

ab

(19)

A positive tax rate will clearly further reduce the amount of spectrum shifted
towards the growing market and cause an even greater social welfare loss.
It is easy to overlook the significance of these results from the
conceptual point of view. It is true that market power will lead to an
allocation of spectrum that is inefficient compared to that selected by the
social planner. However, the monopoly will under allocate spectrum to the
growing market. While this result arises in this particular model, a little
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reflection suggests it is likely to be fairly common in other models: the
problem with monopoly (or other concentrated market forms) is that they
produce too little. But with spectrum as limitational on output, that suggests
they will seek to reallocate too little spectrum. Yet, the FCC policy in its
license transfer process is to tax, i.e., to discourage the transfers. If the
problem the FCC worries about is market power leading firms to behave
inconsistently with the public welfare, then it would be more sensible for the
agency to use its regulatory powers to encourage repurposing of spectrum;
not tax or prohibit it. Despite its desire to repurpose spectrum for mobile
broadband, the FCC’s policies have the consequence of preventing
repurposing of spectrum to more highly valued uses.
F. Numerical Example

A numerical example can be used to illustrate the workings of the
theoretical model. Consider the very simple initial setup:
PA  12  Q A ;

(20)

PB  12  Q B ;

(21)

Q A  Q B  12 ;

(22)

There are 12 units of spectrum to be allocated between the two markets, A
and B. It is straightforward to check that social planner and the firm would
both equally split the scarce spectrum (from Expression 5 and 8):
Q Ae  Q Be  Q A*  Q B*  6 .

(23)

Using the demand specification from Section III.E, now suppose we increase
consumer valuation in market B so that the intercept of the demand curve
rises from 12 to 20:

~
PB  20  QB .

(24)

From Expressions (18) and (20), we see that the social planner will shift more
spectrum to the growing market compared to the profit-maximizing firm:

~
~
QBe  10  8  QB* .

(25)

So, in the absence of regulation, the private firm shifts too little spectrum to
the growing market relative to the socially optimal repurposing. This lack
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of incentive is enhanced if the FCC imposes a tax rate on the repurposing of
spectrum (say, t = 4). Now, by Expression (19), the firm’s optimal
repurposing is only one unit:

~
 1.

(26)

If the tax is levied, then the private firm would provide the growing market
B with only seven units of spectrum. The reduction from eight to seven units
in market B generates a social surplus loss of twelve and a half units.
Keeping five units instead of four in market A generates a social surplus gain
of only seven and a half units. Hence, there would be a net societal loss of
five units due to the FCC tax. This is a very expensive tax in the sense that
while obtaining four units of tax revenue from the firm, the tax on the
transaction robs society (the firm and consumers) of an additional five units
of value.

IV. Policy Implications
The analysis above is abstract and very simplified, but its policy
implications are nonetheless numerous and important. We can summarize
some of the insights provided by the analysis as follows. To begin, the
analysis shows, unsurprisingly, that when values differ across uses or
markets, both a social planner and the private firm will seek to reallocate (at
least some of the) spectrum to the higher valued use. The private firm will
allocate an amount less than or equal to the social planner. This result
suggests that if the regulator wants spectrum moved to a higher valued use
like mobile broadband, then the activity, if anything, should be encouraged.
Yet, as detailed here, imposing conditions on such transfers can sensibly be
viewed as a tax on the repurposing. As is well established by economic
theory, and demonstrated here in this particular instance, such “taxation” will
result in less spectrum being reallocated to the higher valued use. Thus,
imposing conditions on efforts to repurpose spectrum is precisely the wrong
the policy, as such conditions shrink rather than encourage the incentive of
firms to reallocate spectrum to mobile broadband (or any other higher valued
service). Layering on administrative delays and uncertainties further inhibit
secondary market transactions and other repurposing.
In addition, the use of the license transfer authority to impose taxes on
repurposing can be expected to alter the type of transactions that arise. Some
license transfers are of a trivial nature, and may involve players that do not
draw the attention of those seeking to use the process as a mechanism for
rent extraction. Larger transfers, or transfers involving significant parties
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including the more successful mobile providers, are prime targets for
exploitation. As a result, taxation by condition will discourage the larger
scale transactions necessary to resolve spectrum exhaust from arising in the
secondary market, though we may still observe many deals of a less material
nature.52 As a result, spectrum exhaust continues, and society is worse off.
Moreover, we cannot and do not today observe what an unregulated, freely
functioning market for spectrum looks like, and probably will not in the
future as long as the license transfer process involves heavy taxation. There
are likely many transactions that would create significant value to society
that do not manifest for fear of the imposition of value-extracting conditions.
As a practical matter, it may not be possible for the Commission to precommit to frictionless repurposing of spectrum resources, though such precommitment would greatly improve the functioning of the secondary market.
The Agency’s past decisions often (though not always) serve as a guide for
future policy. In an effort to improve matters, the agency could, either
formally or informally, limit the influence of proposed conditions by
establishing boundaries on what will and will not be considered. Consider,
for example, former FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski’s rejection (in
2012) of efforts to limit usage-based pricing for broadband services.53 While
the Commission did not formally issue an order or decision precluding the
agency from considering limits on usage-based pricing, he was unequivocal
in his public statements that the agency would treat usage-based pricing as a
legitimate practice. 54 In the case of spectrum, the Commission or its
Chairman could signal to commenters that the repurposing of spectrum to
mobile broadband is of significant importance and the agency will consider
only conditions narrowly tailored to address specific, documented, and

52. Mayo & Wallsten, supra note 11. Many observed secondary market deals are the
consequence of FCC requirements to divest or sell spectrum assets.
53. Yinka Adegoke, FCC Chief Backs Usage-Based Internet Pricing, REUTERS (May 22,
2012, 7:44 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/22/net-us-cableshow-fcc-idUSBRE84L1
4J20120522.
54. See FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski Prepared Remarks to International CTIA
Wireless 2012 New Orleans (May 8, 2012), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/
DOC-313945A1.pdf (“We’ve also been clear since 2010 that, in a competitive market, usage-based
pricing can be a useful tool — consistent with the goal of driving efficiency, as well as with the
need for return on investment to drive capital expenditures in robust network infrastructure.”); see
also Joe Flint, FCC Chairman Genachowski on Board with Usage Pricing for Broadband, L.A.
TIMES (May 22, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/may/22/entertainment/la-et-ct-fcc20120522 (“Usage-based pricing could be a healthy and beneficial part of the ecosystem” and that
a tiered pricing approach may “increase consumer choice and competition” and “result in lower
prices for people who consume less broadband.”).
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solvable problems arising from a license transfer or adjustment. 55 The
Commission could likewise commit to resolving proposals to repurpose
spectrum on a more expedited and defined schedule. While the
unconditioned repurposing of MSS spectrum was good policy, the decision
took sixteen months to render, including seven month delay to issue an
NPRM following the application. There is clearly room for improvement.
Our analysis also says something about what one might call the
“monopolization narrative.” The fear of some observers seems to be that the
sale or transfer of spectrum to certain firms or for certain uses will result in
a change in market structure, which is undesirable. Some of the conditions
in the DISH case outlined above appear to be motivated by such concerns.
Under spectrum exhaust, such concerns are of limited concern. If output is
constrained before and after the sale, then any changes in market structure
induced by the sale of spectrum will be irrelevant to the outcome: the
industry will sell “all it can” at the “highest price it can get.” Yet, that
“highest price” will be lower than otherwise because the amount of capacity
has increased.56 Economic theory suggests that markets operating in input
constrained environments present far less antitrust risk than do conventional
markets. The mere presence of the binding constraints decouples firm
behavior, and welfare performance, from market structure. The application
of the “usual” structural analysis to these markets is hazardous. Put bluntly,
the Commission and all interested parties need to modify their views of
industry structure to accommodate spectrum shortages.57
With regard to the market power consequences of a transaction, it is
also worth considering the source of the spectrum resource being reallocated.
The existence of “slack” capacity in the “small” market strengthens our
conclusions since, in that case, the removal of spectrum from the slack
market is virtually costless from a societal standpoint, and its repositioning
in the constrained market will put downward pressure on prices. This effort
55. See Koutsky & Spiwak, supra note 9; see also Larry Spiwak, Curbing the FCC’s Ability
to Impose “Voluntary” Merger Commitments . . ., PHOENIX CENTER LAW AND ECONOMICS BLOG
(Mar. 6, 2012, 10:57 AM), http://phoenix-center.org/blog/archives/490.
56. See Beard, et al., Wireless Competition Under Spectrum Exhaust, supra note 1; see also, T.
Randolph Beard & David L. Kaserman, Testing for Collusion During Periods of Input Supply
Disruptions: The Case of Allocations, 45 ANTITRUST BULL. 213 (2000); Luke Froeb, Steven Tschantz
& Philip. Crooke, Bertrand Competition with Capacity Constraints: Mergers Among Parking
Lots, 113 J. ECONOMETRICS 49 (2003); Arturs Kalnins, Luke M. Froeb & Steven Tschantz, Mergers
Increase Output When Firms Compete by Managing Revenue, VAND. L. & ECON. RESEARCH PAPER
NO. 10-27 (2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1670278.
57. Beard, et al., Wireless Competition Under Spectrum Exhaust, id.; see also Beard, et al.,
A Policy Framework for Spectrum Allocation in Mobile Communications, supra note 22.
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to increase capacity in constrained markets is apparent in efforts to transition
MSS, WCS and broadcast spectrum to mobile broadband usage. In contrast,
the movement of spectrum from a very tight, growing market, to a loose one,
is hard to rationalize outside of some strategic plan that involves tightening
capacity still further in an already tight market environment. Certainly,
arguments for limits on repurposing to constrained markets from loose
markets contradicts the arguments, usually made by the same groups, that
some carriers are attempting to create artificial scarcity. Indeed, it is the
proposals to tax the movement of spectrum to constrained markets that create
scarcity.
We suspect that some will argue that the Commission imposes
conditions on transactions in furtherance of some goal, social or otherwise,
so that the benefits from obtaining these goals offset the harms from taxation.
However, basic economics indicates that taxes affect the marginal benefits
or costs of activities and can result in inefficient levels of those activities.
The problem here, however, is three-fold.
First, taxes can be high enough so that little or no spectrum repurposing
occurs. In this case, there is no hypothetical revenue associated with the tax,
and the regulator prevents efficient repurposing of spectrum in return for
nothing. We have assumed a monopoly or cartel structure so far, so the
problem is not ameliorated by market power among the sellers — even if the
industry is cartelized, taxing repurposing of a constraining input is
inefficient.
Second, the taxation of spectrum movements, rather than spectrum or
customers generally, is inherently a bad idea because the only cases in which
the regulation is imposed are precisely those in which spectrum is being
moved from less to more valued uses. It is when one market is growing, or
when a new device or application is introduced, that there is the greatest
private incentive to repurpose spectrum. There is no general reason to
suppose that, under spectrum exhaust, the motives of private firms and the
regulator need be incompatible.
Third, if spectrum allocated to market A does not bind the output of
firms in market A (so spectrum is not scarce in A at equilibrium), the policy
of “taxing” a spectrum transfer to market B becomes even worse. Because
A is not constrained, a marginal repurposing of spectrum from A to B will
cost society nothing in market A. On the other hand, the additional spectrum
in market B will, under virtually any reasonable scenario, reduce prices in B.
The existence of spectrum assets allowed to lie fallow suggests this grossly
inefficient scenario is not merely theoretical.
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In sum, the usefulness of policies actively discouraging transfers of
spectrum from less to more valued uses are very counterproductive. If the
purpose of these impediments to a secondary market is to correct
inefficiencies due to market power, then that purpose is misplaced. If the
purpose is to prevent the exercise of market power, then that purpose is also
misplaced. If the purpose is to use the regulatory leverage of the
Commission to pressure private firms to unilaterally fund social projects,
then the means chosen are grossly inefficient, and the fairness of the entire
enterprise is problematic.

V. Conclusion
Increasingly, it appears that solutions to spectrum exhaust must come,
in large part, from the private sector in the form of secondary market
transactions or other spectrum repurposing. Such transactions, however,
require government blessing in the form of FCC approval of license transfers
or modifications. By the agency’s own admission, this approval process is
an impediment to the functioning of a secondary market. 58 As such, the
agency concluded that “[m]ore flexible spectrum rights will help ensure that
spectrum moves to more productive uses, including mobile broadband,
through voluntary market mechanisms.” 59 Yet, despite these clear
statements of intent, the FCC has been slow to enact policies that would
contribute to the creation of an effective and efficient large-scale secondary
market for commercial spectrum.
In this article, we show that when the regulatory process is used to “tax”
efforts to repurpose spectrum with burdensome conditions, these taxes
reduce the incentive for firms to engage in secondary market transactions
and thus impede market-based solutions for spectrum exhaust. Accordingly,
our article suggests that if the Commission is serious about alleviating
spectrum exhaust and promoting a vibrant large-scale secondary market for
commercial spectrum, then the agency should expeditiously approve efforts
to repurpose spectrum without extraneous conditions, barring legitimate
competitive or interference concerns.

58. In its National Broadband Plan, the agency admitted that the “current spectrum policy
framework sometimes impedes the free flow of spectrum to its most highly valued uses.” Indeed,
the FCC specifically noted that “legacy ‘command and control’ rules, high transaction costs, and
highly fragmented license regimes sometimes preserve outmoded band plans and prevent the
aggregation (or disaggregation) of spectrum into more valuable license configurations.” National
Broadband Plan, supra note 1, at 78–79.
59. Id.

